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The Scope of a Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons:
The Protective Privilege Ends Where the Public
Peril Begins
Recently, in Brady v. Hopper, a United States District Court dis-
missed a $14 million lawsuit filed against John Hinckley Jr.'s psychi-
atrist, Dr. John Hopper, by White House Press Secretary James
Brady and two other men injured in Hinckley's assassination attempt
on President Reagan.' The gravamen of the complaint was that if
Dr. Hopper had properly performed his professional duties he would
have controlled Hinckley's behavior, thus thwarting the presidential
assassination attempt. Additionally, the complaint alleged that Dr.
Hopper should have warned Hinckley's parents and law enforcement
officials of Hinckley's condition and potential for political assassina-
tion.2 Judge Moore, writing for the district court, found that Dr.
Hopper could not have predicted that Hinckley would attempt to
assassinate President Reagan; Hinckley had no history of violent be-
havior and had made no specific threat against any specific victim. 3
This note discusses the nature of a psychiatrist's 4 duty to third
1 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983). The lawsuit was filed in federal district court in
Denver, Colorado by James S. Brady, the President's press secretary, Timothy J. McCarthy, a
Secret Service agent, and Thomas Delahanty, a police officer in Washington, D.C., where the
shooting took place on March 30, 1981. Mr. Brady, who suffered brain damage, sued for $8
million. Mr. McCarthy, who suffered lung and liver damage, sued for $2 million. Officer
Delahanty, who was wounded in the neck, sued for $4 million. Id.
2 570 F. Supp. at 1335.
3 570 F. Supp. at 1333. Early in 1978, Hinckley became a member of the American
Nazi Party in Chicago. According to Michael Allen, president of that organization, Hinckley
kept "talking about shooting people and blowing things up." New York Times, Apr. 1, 1981,
at A19, col. 1.
In 1980, John Hinckley's parents had arranged for their son to obtain psychiatric coun-
selling from Dr. Hopper of the Evergreen Consultants in Denver, Colorado. Allegedly, Hop-
per's professional evaluation of Hinckley "did not alert anyone to the seriousness of his
condition." New York Times, Apr. 5, 1981, at 30, col. 2. Prior to his attack on President
Reagan, Hinckley had developed a romantic fantasy about actress Jodie Foster after seeing
"Taxi Driver," a movie where Miss Foster portrayed a teenage prostitute. Although Hinckley
had never met Foster, he wrote to her: "If you don't love me, I'm going to kill the President."
New York Times, Apr. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 2. In "Taxi Driver," Robert DeNiro portrays a cab
driver who stalks a United States senator after his romantic advances toward one of the sena-
tor's aides are rejected, and then murders several characters. Federal investigators believed
that Hinckley was living out the role of the taxi driver. Id.
4 In this note, the terms "psychiatrist," "therapist," "psychotherapist," and "mental
health professional" are used interchangeably. Additionally, for the sake of convenience, the
masculine pronoun "his" is used instead of "her" when an anonymous psychiatrist is referred
to.
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parties. Part I examines the theory motivating the landmark case of
Tarasof v. Regents of the University of California,5 where the California
Supreme Court imposed tort liability upon a psychotherapist for fail-
ing to warn a potential victim of the dangerous propensities of his
patient. Part II outlines the present scope of a psychiatrist's responsi-
bility, both in terms of a duty to predict dangerousness in patients,
and of a duty to take appropriate measures to protect third persons,
including the duty to warn. The subsequent development of Califor-
nia case law further delineating and limiting the scope of a psychia-
trist's liability is also considered. Part III presents the policy
considerations surrounding both the nature of therapy and a psychi-
atrist's duty to safeguard the public. Part IV summarizes the basis
and scope of a psychiatrist's duty to third parties and offers some
brief suggestions to psychiatrists for avoiding legal liability and mal-
practice suits.
I. Tarasof v. Regents of the University of Caliomia
The landmark case commonly cited as authority for imposing
liability on psychiatrists for their patients' behavior is Tarasoff. Re-
gents of the University of California, a 1976 California Supreme Court
decision. The Tarasoff court held the treating psychotherapist liable
in damages to the parents of a young woman murdered by his pa-
tient.6 On October 27, 1968, Prosenjit Poddar, an Indian student
attending the University of California, Berkeley, shot and killed Ta-
tiana Tarasoff, a woman with whom he was enamored but who had
rejected him. Tatiana's parents sued Poddar's psychologists, the Re-
gents of the University of California, and the campus police.7
5 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
6 The court explained that the therapist could not escape liability merely because the
third party victim was not a patient of his. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 340. The court further
explained that,
[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger *of violence to another, he in-
curs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such
danger. . . . Thus [the discharge of this duty] may call for [the therapist] to warn
the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the
police, or take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances."
Id.
7 Id. at 433-34, 551 P.2d at 341. Plaintiffs asserted four causes of action: 1) failure to
detain a dangerous patient; 2) failure to warn of a dangerous patient; 3) abandonment of a
dangerous patient; and 4) breach of a primary duty to patient and the public. Id. The first
and fourth complaints were barred by governmental immunity. Id. The source of immunity
is § 5154 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which states that "[t]he professional
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Poddar had been undergoing psychotherapy from the Univer-
sity of California health services and had apparently confided to his
psychotherapist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, that he intended to kill Ta-
tiana because she had rejected his affection.8 Dr. Moore subse-
quently warned the campus police of Poddar's violent tendencies,
and the police did briefly detain Poddar for observation. The police
released Poddar shortly thereafter, however, because they claimed he
appeared rational. Although Dr. Moore did warn the campus police,
he did not warn either Tatiana or her parents of Poddar's intent to
kill Tatiana.9
The Tarasof court referred to a situation similar to Brady.' 0 The
reference is interesting in that it came seven years before the Hinck-
ley assassination attempt on President Reagan. The Tarasoff court
felt that where a therapist is aware that his patient expects to at-
tempt to kill the President of the United States, the court would hesi-
tate to hold that the therapist would not be obligated to warn
authorities. "
II. Scope of a Therapist's Duty
A. Basts of Liability: Special Relationship Theoy
In general, a person has no duty to control the conduct of an-
other nor to warn of his dangerous tendencies, unless a "special" rela-
tionship exists between the two persons.' 2 A "special" relationship is
person in charge of the facility providing 72-hour treatment and evaluation, his designee, and
the peace officer responsible for the detainment of the person shall not be held civilly or
criminally liable for any action by a person released at or before the end of 72 hours. .. ."
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5154 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976);
17 Cal. 3d at 450, 551 P.2d at 353. Plaintiffs' third cause of action seeking $10,000 punitive
damages against Dr. Powelson, Dr. Moore's superior, was barred by previous California stat-
utes and decisions. Id at 450, 551 P.2d at 353. The opinion focuses on plaintiffs' second
cause of action-failure to warn of a dangerous patient. Id at 434, 551 P.2d at 342.
8 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342.
9 Id. Dr. Moore contended that he owed no duty to Tatiana or her parents in these
circumstances. Id The court rebutted Dr. Moore's contention that he owed no duty of care
to Tatiana by citing the special relationship between psychotherapist and patient which cre-
ates such a duty. Id. at 436, 551 P.2d at 343. Dr. Moore then contended that such a duty is
"unworkable because therapists cannot accurately predict whether or not a patient will resort
to violence." Id at 438, 551 P.2d at 344.
10 Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 346.
11 Id. The therapist's inability to predict with accuracy that his patient will commit the
crime is not reason to relieve the therapist of liability. Id.





one where an individual seeks the professional advice of another
whom he considers more knowledgeable, and in so doing, puts him-
self in a position of being controlled, or at least swayed, by the profes-
sional's opinions or conduct. The professional, by reason of the
relationship, then has a duty to exercise reasonable care in his course
of dealing with the one seeking advice.' 3 Examples of such special
relationships include the attorney-client, priest-penitent, physician-
patient, and psychiatrist-patient relationship. 14
'The Tarasoff court found that because of Poddar and Dr.
Moore's relationship as patient-psychiatrist, a special relationship ex-
isted between them.15 The Tarasoff court then discussed the duty of
reasonable care required by that relationship.' 6 The court further
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other
a right of protection.
Id. The Tarasff court does not imply that there was a special relation between Tatiana and
Dr. Moore. 17 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343. The duty of reasonable care springs from
the special relation between Dr. Moore and Poddar, as psychotherapist and patient. Id.
13 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 315. See note 12supra.
14 See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 314 A and B, which give examples of other
special relationships and the consequent duty which arises to protect members of the public.
§ 314 A. Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or
injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportuni-
ties for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
§ 314 B. Duty to Protect Endangered or Hurt Employee
(I) If a servant, while acting within the scope of his employment, comes into a posi-
tion of imminent danger of serious harm and this is known to the master or to a
person who has duties of management, the master is subject to liability for failure by
himself or by such person to exercise reasonable care to avert the threatened harm.
(2) If a servant is hurt and thereby becomes helpless when acting within the scope of
his employment and this is known to the master or to the person having duties of
management, the master is subject to liability for his negligent failure or that of such
person to give first aid to the servant and to care for him until he can be cared for by
others.
15 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 340.
16 Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 340. See a/so note 6 supra. The court noted that the difficulty in
predicting dangerousness was no excuse for psychiatrists not warning potential victims of
their patients' dangerous tendencies. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346.
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noted:
The role of the psychiatrist, who is indeed a practitioner of
medicine, and that of the psychologist who performs an allied
function, are like that of the physician who must conform to the
standards of the profession and who must often make diagnoses
and predictions based upon such evaluations. Thus the judg-
ment of the therapist in diagnosing emotional disorders and in
predicting whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence
is comparable to the judgment which doctors and professionals
must regularly render under accepted rules of responsibility. 17
The Tarasoff court analogized the psychiatrist-patient "special"
relationship to the phsyician-patient "special" relationship. Physi-
cians must warn their patients of the possible side effects of pre-
scribed medication if the effects may be dangerous to their health or
to others.'8 Physicians must also warn the families of patients with
infectious diseases of the possibility of the disease spreading. 19 Ac-
cordingly, since a special relationship existed between Dr. Moore and
Poddar, Dr. Moore had a duty to either control the conduct of Pod-
dar to prevent him from causing foreseeable harm to others, or to
warn others of Poddar's dangerous propensities.2 0 Thus, the court
17 Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345. See also notes 6, 9, and 16 supra.
18 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 343-44. See Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa
1973) (physician negligently failed to advise patient of danger from seizures while driving
automobile); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. System, 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (1965) (phy-
sician negligent in failing to warn bus driver of side effects of drug).
19 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 343-44. The court also notes that "a hospital must
exercise reasonable care to control the behavior of a patient which may endanger other per-
sons." Id. This reasoning comes from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 319-320.
Restatement § 319 reads:
Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely
to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reason-
able care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
Restatement § 320 reads:
Duty of Person Having Custody of Another to Control Conduct of Third Persons
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protec-
tion or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent
them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the
third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
20 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 343. The court balanced the alleged harm done to
patients from the warnings about them against the peril to the victim's life, and concluded
[19841
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found that by alerting the university police, Dr. Moore had not fully
discharged his duty to exercise reasonable care. Dr. Moore also had
a duty to warn either Tatiana or her parents of the danger posed by
Poddar.21
Psychiatrists may be held liable for failure to warn, or alterna-
tively for negligent treatment of a patient or misdiagnosis. The spe-
cial relationship between patient and psychiatrist gives rise to all of
these causes of action against a psychiatrist.
B. Therapists' Duty to Predict Dangerousness
Widespread disagreement exists among courts and psychiatrists
concerning the prediction of dangerousness22 and the duty to warn
potential victims of the danger posed by patients. 23 Most courts
agree, however, that psychotherapists and mental hospitals must
comply with accepted legal procedures concerning court approval for
transferring patients, 24 supplying proper information regarding a pa-
that "professional inaccuracy in predicting violence cannot negate the therapist's duty to
protect the threatened victim." Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346. The court further noted that
"[t]he risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of
possible victims that may be saved." Id. at 440-41,551 P.2d at 346. The court does not imply
that there was a special relation between Tatiana and Dr. Moore. Id. at 436-37, 551 P.2d at
343. The duty of reasonable care springs from the general relation between Dr. Moore and
Poddar, as psychotherapist and patient. Id.
21 Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 340. See also notes 6, 9, and 16 supra.
22 See note 33 in/ta and accompanying text. But see notes 28 and 32 in/ra (cases support-
ing the notion of a broader duty on the part of therapist to warn potential victims).
In predicting dangerousness, one might argue that there should be more potential liabil-
ity on psychiatrists releasing mental patients than on psychiatrists simply treating out-pa-
tients. In mental hospitals, more control is exercised over the patient, and with a greater
opportunity to observe patients, psychiatrists can make a more accurate prediction of the
patient's dangerousness. Although there may be some logic to this argument, the locale of the
patient appears irrelevant to the psychiatrist's primary duty to diagnose, since both private
psychiatrists and those who work in mental hospitals are licensed and hold themselves out as
psychiatrists competent to diagnose mental disorders. See J. Fleming and B. Maximov, The
Patient or His Victim: The Therapist'r Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1974). The
authors argue that the amount of control that can be exercised, for example, with in-patients
as contrasted to out-patients, is irrelevant to the creation or negation of a duty to warn. Id.
The duty to warn is present regardless of the amount of control that a psychiatrist exercises
over his patient. Id. As previously mentioned, the duty is "inextricably woven" into the duty
to diagnose or predict dangerousness; see notes 45 and 51 in/a. Hence, since all psychiatrists
are licensed to diagnose, they are under a duty to predict dangerousness, regardless of the
amount of control exercised over the patient.
23 See note 33 in/ra (cases supporting the notion of a broader duty on the part of therapist
to warn potential victims). But see note 66 infra (cases supporting the specific threats to spe-
cific victims rule).
24 See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.
1976). In Sem/er the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held a psychiatric hospital liable
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tient's mental condition at release hearings, 25 and complying with
police orders to notify officials upon a patient's release.26 In other
words, where the psychiatrist promised a policeman or judge that he
would notify authorities upon a patient's release, he is then legally
bound by his promise to do so.
Dr. Moore, the defendant psychotherapist in Tarasoff, argued
unsuccessfully that therapists cannot accurately predict the danger-
ousness of their patients.27 The American Psychiatric Association, in
an amicus brief in Tarasoff, indicated that "therapists, in the present
state of the art, are unable reliably to predict violent acts."' 28
Although the American Psychiatric Association has argued that
psychiatrists cannot accurately predict dangerousness, 29 many courts
for the murder of a girl by one of its patients, because the hospital transferred the patient
from day care to out-patient status without the required court approval. Id. at 121.
25 See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 357 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C. 1973). In Hicks the District
Court for the District of Columbia held a mental hospital negligent for failing to transmit
adequate information to the trial court concerning its patient's mental condition, resulting in
the patient's premature release. The patient murdered his wife shortly after he was released.
Id. at 434.
26 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978). In Williams,
Judge Bogne of the District Court of South Dakota held a hospital liable for its failure to
notify county authorities, as it had been ordered to do by police and agreed to do itself, of the
discharge and release of its patient, a man with a known propensity for violence. Id. at 1040.
The hospital violated its agreement to notify the police upon the patient's release. Id. at 1046.
27 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 344. The court ruled that the therapist's duty includes
not only diagnosing the danger posed, but also warning foreseeable victims of such danger.
17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 344. The court further held that predictions about dangerous-
ness of a patient must be made under accepted rules of professional responsibility. 17 Cal. 3d
at 438, 551 P.2d at 344. Standards are determined by what similar professionals in the com-
munity would do. Since the therapist is licensed to diagnose emotional disorders, and in fact
holds himself out as capable of doing so, he should be capable of predicting danger posed by
their patients.
28 Id at 438, 551 P.2d at 344. It is ironic that therapists hold themselves out as being
capable professionals, but when threatened by a lawsuit they suddenly become inept. It
seems that by the very act of becoming licensed, a therapist should have to accept some
responsibility for understanding and predicting the dangers posed by his patients.
Amicus representing the American Psychiatric Association cited various articles which
indicated that "therapists, in the present state of the art, are unable reliably to predict violent
acts." Id. The articles cited by amicus included: Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COM-
MUNITY MENTAL HEALTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Monahan ed. 1975); Dia-
mond, The Pschiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Ennis &
Litwick, Psychiatqr and the Presumption of Expertise." Flpping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 693 (1974). Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, n. 10. See generally A. Stone, The
TarasoffDecisions: Suing Pchotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976).
29 See note 28 supra. For a general discussion on the difficulty of predicting dangerous-
ness, see Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" Cn'minal Defendants, 66 VA. L.
REV. 523 (1980); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Ennis & Litwick, supra note
28, at 696; Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L.
[1984]
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have rejected this premise.3 0 The opinion of these courts regarding
the difficulty of predicting dangerousness is aptly summarized in
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,31 where the court stated that
it may be difficult for medical professionals to predict whether a
particular mental patient may pose a danger to himself or others.
This factor alone, however, does not justify banning recovery in
all situations. The standard of care for health professionals ade-
quately takes into account the difficult nature of the problems
facing psychotherapists. . . . Under this standard, a therapist
who uses the proper psychiatric procedures is not negligent even
if his diagnosis may have been incorrect. Given this protection,
the Court is of the opinion that the difficulty in predicting dan-
gerousness does not justify denying recovery in all cases.3 2
REV. 1025 (1974); Note, Imposing a Duly to Warn on Prychiatrist: A Judicial Threat to the Psychiat-
nic Profession, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 283 (1977); Shah, Dangerousness - A Paradgm for Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 22 Am. PSYCH. 224 (1978).
30 See Case v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (psychiatrist not liable
because he had complied with the community's accepted professional standards in his deter-
mination of patient's dangerousness); Ellis v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 4 (D.S.C. 1978)
(psychiatrists not liable to victim because they had complied with generally accepted medical
standards in the community in predicting dangerousness); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J.
Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1974) (psychiatrist liable for failure to predict dangerousness of
patient and warn victim); Homere v. State, 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975) (state
hospital liable for failure to predict patient's dangerousness); Cameron v. State, 37 A.D.2d 46,
322 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1971) (hospital not liable for misdiagnosing dangerousness of patient be-
cause done in compliance with community's accepted psychiatric standards).
See also Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41 (1983)
(psychiatrist liable for negligent failure to diagnose dangerousness); Durfiinger v. Artiles, 673
P.2d 86 (Kan. 1983) (psychiatrist liable for negligent release of dangerous patient and failure
to predict dangerousness).
In Hedlund, the victim relied primarily on Tarasof in claiming a negligent failure to diag-
nose dangerousness. The court agreed with the victim that misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose
dangerousness on the part of the therapist is grounds for professional negligence. Hedlund, 34
Cal. 3d at 696, 669 P.2d at 41.
The Durfl'nger court held that a physician must use reasonable and ordinary care in the
treatment of patients, must use his best judgment and exercise that skill which is possessed by
other physicians in the same locale. Durft'nger, 673 P.2d at 92. While the psychiatrist in
Durfinger argued the difficulty in predicting dangerousness, the court held him liable for the
negligent release of a patient with known violent tendencies, who subsequently killed several
of his family members. Id. at 90. The court held that a psychiatrist had a duty to take
affirmative action to protect third persons either by notifying a potential victim, calling the
police, or instituting commitment proceedings. Id. at 95.
31 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980). In Lipari, a psychiatric patient entered a crowded
nightclub and randomly fired a loaded shotgun into the crowd, killing one person and injur-
ing a second, the plaintiff. Id The court found that the defendant therapist owed a duty to
anyone foreseeably endangered by the negligent treatment of the psychiatric patient. IR at
194-95.
32 Id at 192. Many courts recognize the existence of standards in the psychiatric profes-
sion for diagnosing dangerousness and the corresponding duty of psychiatrists and psycho-
therapists to conform to these standards. This duty complies with what similar professionals
NOTES
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Psychiatrists are not required to be omniscient when diagnosing dan-
gerousness. They must simply "take those steps, and initiate those
measures and procedures customarily taken or initiated for the care
and treatment of mentally ill and dangerous persons by mental
health professionals practicing in the community." 33 When a psychi-
atrist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of vio-
lence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to
protect those who foreseeably might be endangered by his patient's
conduct. 34
Liability is limited to foreseeable potential victims, but the ther-
apist need not know the exact identity of the potential victim, only
that his patient foreseeably could have posed an unreasonable risk of
harm to the potential victim or to a class of persons of which the
victim was a member.35 If the therapist could not have reasonably
foreseen a threat of danger by his patient and his patient performs an
unforeseen and unforeseeable act of violence upon a victim, the ther-
apist will normally not be held liable in hindsight. 36
in the community would do. See note 30 supra. For example, in Bradley Center v. Wessner,
296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a duty fell upon a private
mental hospital to exercise due care in the control of its patients. The hospital was found
negligent in issuing an unrestricted weekend pass to a patient who had been predetermined to
be a known threat to his wife. Id at 694. The court found that the exercise of due care in
these circumstances was determined by reference to the standards of the psychiatric profes-
sion: what a competent psychiatrist in similar circumstances would do. Id. at 696.
33 497 F. Supp. at 187 (D. Neb. 1980). See Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983).
The Peterson court followed Lipari in concluding that the psychiatrist had a duty to take
reasonable precautions to protect anyone foreseeably endangered by the patient's mental
problems. Id at 237. The psychiatrist testified at trial that his patient was potentially dan-
gerous and his behavior unpredictable, especially if he used the drug "angel dust," which the
psychiatrist predicted would be quite likely. Id at 235. Nevertheless, the psychiatrist failed
to petition the court for a 90-day commitment possible under the state statute, or take any
other precautions for the protection of those persons foreseeably endangered by the patient's
drug-related mental problems. Id But see note 36 injfa and accompanying text.
34 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 340. See notes 30-33 supra. For example, in McIntosh v.
Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979), the New Jersey Superior Court held that
a psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably
necessary to protect an intended or potential victim of his patient when he deter-
mines, or should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accordance
with the standards of his profession established at trial, that the patient is or may
present a probability of danger to that person.
Id. at 488-91, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
35 497 F. Supp. at 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980). See also cases cited in note 30 supra. But see
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728 (1980) and note 43 infra. In
Thompson, the court limited potential victims to only those "readily identifiable." See notes
42-44 infra and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Case v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Ellis v. United
[1984]
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C. Therapist's Duly to Warn Third Parties of the Danger Posed by a
Patient
Tarasof imposed upon psychiatrists a general duty to warn, re-
gardless of whether potential victims could be specifically identi-
fied.3 7 The duty could include: 1) warning potential, foreseeable
States, 484 F. Supp. 4 (D.S.C. 1978); Ross v. Central Louisiana State Hospital, 392 So. 2d 698
(1980); Cameron v. State, 37 A.D.2d 46, 322 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1971).
In Case v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held psychiatrists free of liability for their patient's murder of a
victim because they had complied with the professional standards in their determination that
the patient was not dangerous and could be discharged. Similarly, in Ellis v. United States,
484 F. Supp. 4 (D.S.C. 1978), the District Court of South Carolina held that the United
States was not liable for medical malpractice in granting a custody pass which complied with
generally accepted medical and psychiatric standards, even though during the absence, the
patient hurled his daughter from a second story porch to her death. Moreover, in Cameron v.
State, 37 A.D.2d 46, 322 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1971), the New York appellate court held a hospital
not liable for the decision to release a mental patient, even though the decision proved to be
erroneous by hindsight. The decision to release the patient complied with accepted psychiat-
ric standards regarding the determination of dangerousness of mental patients.
In Ross v. Central Louisiana State Hospital, 392 So. 2d 698 (La. Ct. App. 1980), a Loui-
siana appellate court held a state hospital not liable for the release of a mental patient who
shot and killed her children after she failed to take her medication, because given the facts
and circumstances at the time of the patient's release, the hospital could not have foreseen her
actions. The patient had no tendency to violence, and the medication she was taking was not
for the purpose of preventing violence. Id at 699. Since by accepted medical and psychiatric
standards the hospital could not have foreseen the patient's reaction to not taking her
medicine, the hospital was under no duty to warn the patient or her family of potential
danger. Id See also Leverett v. State, 399 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978), where the court
found that a hospital may be held liable for the negligent release of a mental patient only
when the hospital, in exercising its medical judgement, knew or should have known that the
patient, upon his release, would be very likely to cause harm to himself or others. Such likeli-
hood must be more than a mere possibility and not based on hindsight. Id at 110. The duty
to predict dangerousness on the part of the psychiatrist and the duty to initiate procedures
customarily initiated for mentally ill persons is dictated by what mental health professionals
practicing in the community would do. See note 33 suipra and accompanying text. Therefore,
if the psychiatrist took the proper psychiatric procedures in a given situation, he will be pro-
tected from liability if something unforeseen does happen. Id
37 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). A well-known case following the Tarasoffcourt's
finding that a psychiatrist owes a duty to the general public for his patient's behavior is
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979). The superior court of New
Jersey held Dr. Milano, a psychiatrist who had been treating Lee Morgenstein, a 15 year old
boy, liable for Morgenstein's killing Miss McIntosh, a girl with whom Morgenstein was infat-
uated. Morgenstein had feelings of violence toward McIntosh and had confided to Dr. Mi-
lano his jealousy of McIntosh's boyfriends. The New Jersey court relied heavily on Tarasoff
and the special relationship between a psychiatrist and his patient creating a duty to warn
third parties of his patient's potential danger. 168 N.J. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 512. Alter-
natively, the court relied on a physician's duty to the general public to protect society from
danger, analogous to contagious disease cases. 168 NJ. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 512. De-
fendant Milano argued that his patient had shown no signs of violence toward McIntosh;
thus, he could not have predicted that he would kill her. The court remained firm, however,
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victims; 2) warning other persons who could warn the victims of the
danger; 3) warning the police; or 4) taking whatever other steps seem
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 38 If the patient is an
out-patient, one step might include having the patient committed
under applicable state statutes for a short period of observation.
Since Tarasof, some courts have narrowly construed the duty to warn
by limiting potential victims to "readily identifiable" 39 persons or
those identifiable after a "moment's reflection." 4° Both constructions
considerably limit a psychiatrist's potential liability.41
In Thompson v. County of Alameda, the California Supreme Court
limited foreseeable victims to those readily identifiable. 42 In Thomp-
son, the county released from custody a juvenile delinquent, known
by the treating psychiatrist to have dangerous and violent tendencies
toward other children. 43 The county did not warn the local police,
the delinquent's parents, or the parents of neighborhood children. A
short time later, the plaintiff's five year old son was sexually asaulted
and murdered. The court refused to hold the county liable for any
failure to warn.44 The court did recognize that the neighborhood
children were foreseeable potential victims; however, it found no
duty on the part of the county to warn the children or their parents,
simply because there were too many possible victims to warn.45
Moreover, the court disregarded as a basis of liability the duty im-
posed by Tarasof to take whatever steps are "reasonably necessary in
holding that Milano should have known that his patient was a threat, and that his failure to
warn was the proximate cause of McIntosh's death. 168 N.J. Super. at 482, 403 A.2d at 508.
38 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 340. One or all of these steps may be required to fulfill
the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm, depending on the circum-
stances of the case.
39 See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728 (1980); notes 44-49
infra and accompanying text. For other non-California courts which have applied a similar
definition to potential victims, see note 33 supra.
40 See Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981);
notes 52-57 infra nd accompanying text.
41 See notes 42-57 infra and accompanying text.
42 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728 (1980).
43 Id at 741, 614 P.2d at 728. The county knew that the juvenile had "latent, extremely
dangerous and violent propensities regarding young children, and that sexual assaults upon
young children and violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing him into the
community." Id. at 747, 614 P.2d at 730.
44 Id. at 747, 614 P.2d at 730. The court found the class of people to whom a warning
would have to be given to be too broad to be effective. Where there were no specific individu-
als nor any specific threats, the court declined to impose a general duty to warn. Id. at 759,
614 P.2d at 738.
45 Id. at 757, 614 P.2d at 736. "[T]he warning sought by plaintiffs would of necessity
have to be made to a broad segment of the population and would be only general in nature."
Id at 757, 614 P.2d at 736.
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the circumstances" in order to avoid foreseeable harm.46
The Thompson majority considered and rejected both a general
warning to the community and a specific warning to the delinquent's
mother. Warning the delinquent's mother of her child's dangerous
tendencies would appear to have been reasonably and minimally nec-
essary, since she could have exerted some control over the youth, pos-
sibly preventing her son's attack on the neighborhood child.47 And,
considering the Thompson court's concern with the burden of warning
the large number of potential victims, warning the delinquent's
mother seems amazingly simple, yet effective.
Judge Tobriner, who wrote the majority opinion in Tarasoff, vig-
orously dissented in Thompson, arguing that the special relationship
between psychiatrist and patient created a broad duty to warn.48 He
maintained that even if a general duty to warn was not appropriate,
at least a duty on the part of the county to warn the juvenile's
mother of her son's violent tendencies was required.49 Nevertheless,
the Thompson court limited the duty imposed by Tarasof to warning
"readily identifiable" victims, 50 stating that where an individual
poses a potential risk of harm to a significant portion of the commu-
nity, no duty arises on the part of the psychiatrist to warn anyone.5'
In AMavroudis v. Superior Court,5 2 a California appellate court fur-
ther defined "potential victims." The Mavroudis court held that a
psychiatrist has a duty to warn any victim whose identity could be
revealed after a "moment's reflection. '53 The court noted that the
therapist's duty arises when the therapist determines or should deter-
mine that his patient presents a serious threat to a third person. The
court further observed that the victims need not be specifically
named by the patient, only that a potential victim be identified after
46 Id. at 757, 614 P.2d at 736. The court found that a general warning would be ineffec-
tive and an unnecessary expenditure of limited police resources. Id at 757, 614 P.2d at 736.
47 See text accompanying notes 48 and 49.
48 27 Cal. 3d at 760, 614 P.2d at 738. Judge Tobriner's argument seems plausible, be-
cause if the hospital had warned the mother, she might have exercised greater control over
her son.
49 Id. at 760, 614 P.2d at 738. Judge Tobriner's dissent echoes the Tarasoff majority opin-
ion. His concern is the death of innocent persons which could have been prevented by the
psychiatrist warning the victims' parents.
50 Id at 753-54, 614 P.2d at 734. Readily identifiable victims seem to include only those
toward whom the patient has made specific threats.
51 Id at 760, 614 P.2d at 738. The court held that where the victim was a member of a
"large amorphous public group," the county had no duty to warn. Id. at 760, 614 P.2d at
738.
52 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981).
5.3 Id at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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a "moment's reflection" by the therapist. 54
Factually, Mavroudis limited the class of victims required to be
warned to the parents of a young man who had been receiving psy-
chiatric treatment. The parents were attacked and injured by their
son, whom the psychiatrist knew to be dangerous. 55 The court did
not find that the psychiatrist's duty extended to warning the commu-
nity in which the parents lived, although under a Tarasoff analysis the
entire community could have been identified as a potential victim. 56
The court held that the psychiatrist could have identified the parents
as potential victims after a "moment's reflection," and that if he felt
their son posed a danger, the doctor should have warned them.57
Third parties may have a cause of action against the therapist
for failure to warn when they are identifiable potential victims of the
therapist's patient,58 even when the patient made no specific threat
against them.59 The therapist is bound by this duty because he holds
himself out and is licensed as one who diagnoses psychological
problems and emotional and mental disorders. 60 In diagnosing dan-
gerousness, the therapist must exercise the "reasonable degree of skill,
knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members
of the profession." '6'
A psychiatrist's duty to warn third parties of the danger posed
by his patient springs from the primary duty of a psychiatrist to diag-
54 Id. at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court noted that the therapist need not be
perfect in his forecast of dangerousness, but merely exercise the standard of care ordinarily
exercised by members of his profession. Id at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
55 Id. at 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 728. The court stated that it would be unreasonable for
the psychiatrist to interrogate his patient to determine potential victims. Id at 601, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 729.
56 Id. at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See notes 6-16 supra and accompanying text.
57 102 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 734. This analysis is similar to the ap-
proach suggested by Judge Tobriner in his dissent in Thompson, where he argued that at least
the mother of a juvenile known to be a child sexual offender should be warned. See notes 45-
46supra. But see Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), where, under Penn-
sylvania law, a VA hospital was held not liable for the release of its patient and the subse-
quent beating of plaintiffs with whom the patient was planning to stay, even though hospital
personnel knew the patient had a tendency towards violence when drinking. Id. The Leedy
court refused to extend the Tarasoff warning to one not a readily identifiable, precise victim
specifically threatened. The court did not apply the Mavroudis "moment's reflection" stan-
dard in judging victims, because it considered the plaintiffs with whom the patient was stay-
ing to be in a class of persons too broad to impose a general warning. Id at 1131.
58 See note 37 supra.
59 Id. See also notes 5-21 supra and accompanying text (Tarasoff), notes 52-57 supra and
accompanying text (Mavroudis). But see notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text (Thompson).
60 See notes 5-21 supra and accompanying text (Taraso_#), and note 58 supra.
61 Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41 (1983).
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nose and treat his patients; the two are inseparable. 62 The psychia-
trist is obligated by the psychiatrist-patient relationship to use
reasonable care and take the steps necessary for the protection of
both his patient and those foreseeably endangered by the patient's
conduct.63
The courts disagree as to whom the psychiatrist must warn.
Some courts hold that the psychiatrist has a duty to warn any fore-
seeable victim regardless of whether the patient has made specific
threats against him.64 Other courts hold that a psychiatrist only has
a duty to warn those persons against whom the patient has made
specific threats.65
62 The warning aspect of the duty imposed on the therapist to diagnose dangerousness
posed by his patient is "inextricably interwoven with the diagnostic function." Id. at 704, 669
P.2d at 809.
63 See notes 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text. In Homere v. State, 48 A.D.2d 422,
370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975), the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held the state
liable "not for an erroneous medical judgment, but rather for its failure to make anything
other than a purely administrative decision to release" the patient. Id. at 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d
at 249. Hospital authorities had failed to make any further evaluation of their decision to
discharge the patient after he had engaged in behavior necessitating a straight jacket. The
state's psychiatrist failed to take those steps necessary to protect the potential victims of his
patient. Here, the steps necessary would simply have been not releasing the patient and
making further observation of him.
A typical decision where the psychiatrist failed to take the necessary steps to protect the
potential victims of his patient is Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272
F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). The court held that the government agents who were employees
at a government mental hospital exercised no care at all in placing a certain patient on leave
of absence at a ranch. The patient was seriously mentally ill, but the hospital warned the
ranch owner that the patient merely suffered a nervous breakdown. Dr. Russell 0. Saxvik, an
expert in the psychiatric field, testified that the ranch owner should have been given specific
instructions with regard to the patient. Id at 414. Dr. Saxvik stated that under accepted
psychiatric practices, the mental hospital should have known the whereabouts of its patient
on leave, and the hospital should have in turn notified the committing health board. Id The
government's agents were negligent in both substandard professional conduct and careless
custodial care of the patient. Id at 418. The court held that considering the circumstances
under which the patient had been placed on leave of absence, where the patient had repeat-
edly threatened to kill his wife if given the opportunity, the government's agents exercised no
care at all. Id at 417.
64 See note 30 supra. But see notes 42-49 supra (Thompson) and notes 66-70 infa (Brady a.
Hopper).
65 See Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F.
Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Thompson v. County of Alemeda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728
(1980); Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977); Cairl v. State, 323
N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982). In Bellah v. Greenson, the court held that there was no duty on the
part of the therapist to warn the parents of their daughter's suicidal tendencies. 73 Cal. App.
3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977). The court limited the warning required by Tarasoff to
potential danger directed at others, not self-directed, thus the therapist had no duty to warn
anyone of his patient's suicidal tendencies. Id at 916, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
In Leed, Judge Muir of the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the psychiatrist
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
For example, Judge Moore's dismissal of Brady's, McCarthy's,
and Delahanty's suit against Dr. Hopper, Hinckley's psychiatrist, in-
dicates that he has followed in the footsteps of the Thompson court in
adopting the "specific threats to specific victims" rule. 66 Judge
Moore found that regardless of whether Hopper conformed to the
standard of care required by the psychiatric profession in his treat-
ment of Hinckley, he had no duty to control Hinckley or to warn
anyone of Hinckley's danger. This was so since Hinckley made no
specific threats to any specific victims.6 7 Judge Moore also noted the
lack of any relation between Dr. Hopper and the plaintiffs. Citing to
Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. ,68 he analogized the attenuated relation
and duty between Dr. Hopper and the plaintiffs to that of Mrs.
had no duty to warn the people with whom a potentially dangerous patient went to visit.
The patient, who had a known tendency to violence when drinking, attacked and battered
the people with whom he stayed after his discharge from the hospital. 510 F. Supp. 1125
(M.D. Pa. 1981). The psychiatrist knew who the patient intended to visit, but the court
reasoned that the potential victims were not a group of readily identifiable persons, because
the patient posed no danger to them any different from the danger he posed to anyone with
whom he might be in contact when he became violent. Id at 1131. Dr. Hostetter, a board
certified psychiatrist and expert witness at the trial, testified that, in his opinion, a hospital
following proper psychiatric procedures should have been aware of the patient's potential for
violence and danger, and should have warned any person with whom the medical staff rea-
sonably knew or should have known the patient would have frequent social contact. Id at
1130. In spite of Dr. Hostetter's expert testimony, the court held that the hospital had no
duty to warn. Id
Similarly, in Cairl, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state hospital did not have
a duty to warn parents of their son's pyromaniacal tendencies. The son subsequently started
a fire at home which killed his younger sister and caused significant property damage. 323
N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. 1982). The court reasoned that "the duty to warn is not owed to
statistically probable victims, but rather to specifically targeted victims." Id at 26. The court
further stated that the pyromaniacal child posed no danger to his parents any different from
the danger he posed to any member of the public with whom he might be in contact when
seized with the urge to start a fire. Id.
66 Brady, 570 F. Supp. at 1339. See note 65supra. See also notes I-3 supra and accompany-
ing text. The courts in Leedy and Cairl followed a similar approach. See note 65 supra.
67 Brady, 570 F. Supp. at 1339. Judge Moore questioned whether there was a foreseeable
risk that Hinckley would inflict the harm that he did, and decided there was not. Id The
basis of liability in the Hinckley case, were it decided for Brady, et al., would not be that
Hopper had failed to warn Brady as an individual, but rather that he failed to take those
steps necessary to protect the foreseeable victims of Hinckley. Arguably, anyone who was
normally near the President would be a potential victim since Hinckley had made threats and
general intimations about presidential assassinations.
68 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (Ct. App. 1928). Chief Justice Cardozo held the
Long Island Railroad not liable for its servant's dropping an unkown package of explosives on
the tracks, causing an explosion which dropped a scale on the plaintiff, injuring her. Id at
341, 162 N.E. at 101. The plaintiff was too far removed from the servant's action to recover
on a negligence theory. Id at 341, 162 N.E. at 101.
However, third party's do not always need to show the relation between themselves and
the psychiatrist. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
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Palsgraf and the guard at the railroad station. Thus, even if Dr.
Hopper had a duty to warn President Reagan and failed to do so,
there remained no duty to the plaintiffs and hence, no liability.69
Judge Moore rejected the plaintiffs' argument which relied primarily
on Lipari's reasoning. Lipari reasoned that the therapist need not
know the identity of the injured party, but only that the injured
party was a member of a class of persons who were exposed to an
unreasonable risk of harm by the patient. Judge Moore rejected the
reasoning of Lipari because it created a duty on the part of the thera-
pist to the public at large.70
III. Policy Considerations
Several policy issues must be considered in analyzing profes-
sional liability. These issues include the role of a psychiatrist, patient
confidentiality, the goal of therapy, the issue of deterrence if a pa-
tient's confidences are disclosed, and the difficulty in predicting dan-
gerousness. Ultimately, however, these policy issues are outweighed
by society's interests. Society must be protected from unreasonable,
avoidable dangers.
A. The Proper Role of a Psychiatrist- Counselor or Judge?
By the very nature of psychotherapy, the patient is encouraged
to freely vocalize his fantasies, repressed feelings, and desires.71 Re-
quiring psychiatrists to warn potential victims every time a patient
expresses feelings of anger toward someone would seriously interfere
with the treatment, 72 both because of the breach in confidentiality 73
and the practical problem of determining whether a patient really
69 Brad, 570 F. Supp. at 1339.
70 Id. See note 67 supra. Judge Moore overlooked Dr. Hopper's alleged negligent treat-
ment of Hinckley in reaching his decision, since he could have found Hopper liable on a
theory of negligence or malpractice for failing to use due care in treating his patient. The
negligence would then be the proximate cause of Brady's injury. See also notes 31-33 supra
and accompanying text.
71 See notes 75, 77, and 79supra.
72 See Fleming and Maximov, note 22 supra.
Confidentiality of communication is only one prerequisite to treatment. It sets the
stage for an exchange of thought, word and action at the emotional level. Without
trust, there can be no proper transference. In fact, the essence of much psychother-
apy is the learning of trust in the external world by the formation of a trusting
relationship with the therapist. This becomes the model for trust in the external
world and ultimately in the self.
Id. at 1041, n.68 (quoting D. Dawidoff, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 44 (1973)).
73 See notes 77, 79, and 80 infra and accompanying text.
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intended to carry out his violent feelings.7 4
If psychiatrists are required to sit as judges in the patient-psychi-
atrist relationship, patients may consequently have reservations
about expressing their feelings. Thus, an important goal of psycho-
therapy, helping patients express their repressed feelings, will be
unattained.7 5 Not only may patients be frustrated in achieving
mental health, but psychiatrists may be overly concerned with pro-
tecting themselves from potential liability and warn all possible vic-
tims at the slightest hint of danger. 76
The psychiatrist's role should not be that of a judge, but one of
counselor, helping the patient accept himself and work through his
problems with the knowledge that his trust is well-placed." The
scope of the Tarasof decision requiring psychiatrists to warn potential
victims threatens the maintenance of confidentiality between psychi-
atrist and patient. 78 If a patient cannot trust his psychiatrist to keep
confidential sensitive information, he will be deterred from seeking
and continuing treatment, 79 just as Poddar discontinued his therapy
after he was detained by the campus police.80
The process of voicing repressed anger in therapy would seem to
74 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 344.
75 See Fleming and Maximov, note 22 supra, at 1034. A frequent goal of treatment is to
encourage the patient to discharge suppressed feelings, including aggression and even anger.
Id.
76 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334, 344. The American Psychiatric Associ-
ation cited numerous articles indicating that psychiatrists tend to consistently overpredict
violence, and are more often incorrect than correct. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 344; see also note
28 supra.
77 See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014, (West 1966) which states:
[P]sychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon the fullest revelation of the
most intimate and embarrassing details of the patient's life. . . [And although] the
granting of the privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold relevant infor-
mation, the interests of society will be better served if psychiatrists are able to assure
patients that their confidences will be protected.
78 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334; see also notes 75-77 supra. The Tarasoff
decision requires the therapist to sit as judge of his patient, rather than as counselor.
79 See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The opinion reads in
pertinent part:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world.
He exposes to the therapist not only what his words express; he lays bare his entire
self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo
psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they can-
not get help except on that condition. . . . It would be too much to expect them to
do so if they knew that all they say - and all that the psychiatrist learns from what
they say - may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand.
Id. at 401 (quoting from M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272
(1952)).
80 Tarasqff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342. One can hardly blame a patient for
[ 1984]
[Vol. 59:770]
actually deter, not promote, violence. Patients can vent the negative
feelings in the psychiatrist's office instead of repressing them and
later venting them upon a victim.8' If psychiatrists must warn poten-
tial victims to avoid professional liability, their patients will lose the
opportunity to work through repressed feelings and the opportunity
for growth and change.8 2 Perhaps the real victim in requiring psy-
chiatrists to warn potential victims is the patient himself.
B. Therapist' Ephemeral Duy to Safeguard the Public
Although policy considerations for protecting the psychiatrist-
patient relationship are important, these policies are outweighed by
society's interest. Society must be protected from the unreasonable
risk posed by a dangerous patient.8 3 Such a risk is avoidable with
little effort on the part of the psychiatrist. A psychiatrist's role is not
one-dimensional, nor should it be. Therapists must not only be sym-
pathetic to their patients, but must also consider the broader impli-
cations of their actions. Therapists must realize that their overall
objective is to serve the patient and society. After all, patients see
therapists to help themselves adjust in society.
While it is impossible to foresee all the possible and varied inter-
actions between a patient and other members of the public, it is feasi-
ble to foresee that an individual with latent propensities for violence,
either toward particular individuals or in general, will harm someone
if certain precautions are not taken. While some may not agree that
therapists have a duty to safeguard the public,8 4 some do recognize a
moral obligation of the therapist in this regard, at least insofar as the
therapists is able to avoid foreseeable risk.85
discontinuing treatment if his confidences in the psychiatrist result in his being detained by
police or committed to a treatment facility.
81 See, e.g., C.R. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON: A THERAPIST'S VIEW OF PSYCHO-
THERAPY, (1961); A.H. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1962).
82 See note 81 supra.
83 See notes 84-89 infra and accompanying text.
84 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
85 See cases cited in note 30 supra and accompanying text.
Our Anglo-Saxon system of law often does not incorporate moral obligations into its
legal system. An individual has no duty to rescue a person in grave danger, for example,
during a mugging or rape, and incurs no liability for failing to intervene or otherwise act.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 315. Similarly, the individual has no duty to prevent a stran-
ger from committing suicide. Id. Ironically, although our system does not impose a duty
upon a citizen to help another, if help is given, the rescuer can be held liable for unintentional
harm inflicted on the rescued person. RESTATEMENT, surpra note 12, §§ 319-320. See Clayton
v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, 14 NJ. Super. 390, 82 A.2d 458 (1951), where a
good samaritan was held liable for battery when he incorrectly set plaintiff's broken arm
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Especially where a special relationship exists between two per-
sons, or where one party has control over another, the professional or
"controller" must use reasonable care to avoid an unreasonable risk
of harm to others.86 Under such a duty, a therapist's role cannot
simply be to diagnose his patients. He must take all those steps nec-
essary to avoid foreseeable harm from the patient upon others. This
duty may include violating the confidentiality of the psychiatrist-pa-
tient relationship, but confidentiality often yields to a higher interest.
For example, attorneys are required under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to reveal the confidences of their client when the cli-
ent intends to commit a future crime. 7 The attorney must also dis-
close the information necessary to prevent a crime.88 The attorney's
duty is analogous to the therapist where the therapist can foresee that
his patient will commit a future crime upon either a specific victim
or upon the public. Where the interest of society is so strong, i.e.,
preventing a severe injury or death, confidentiality must yield.
If confidences are broken, it is not a foregone conclusion that all
is lost in the psychiatrist-patient relationship. No empirical proof ex-
ists to demonstrate that the goal of therapy will not be attained, or
that patients will be deterred from seeking therapy.89 In fact, some
studies indicate results to the contrary, reasoning that patients go to
therapists as a cry for help and want the therapist to disclose their
hidden problems so that they can be helped.9° As a professional, a
therapist could discreetly warn the authorities or potential victims.
before a doctor could arrive. In terms of personal liability, the law makes it more appealing
to be a detached rubberneck than to be a good samaritan.
86 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 315, 319.
87 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1980).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not have a privilege rule for the psychiatrist-patient
relationship. The California Evidence Code, however, does have such a privilege, but also
has a dangerous patient exception to the privilege. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
The American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics provides that a physi-
cian must reveal his patient's confidences when it is necessary to "protect the welfare of the
individual or of the community." AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957), re-
pinted in AMA JUDICIAL COUNCIL OPINIONS AND REPORTS 57 (1966).
88 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c) (3) (1980). ABA Opin-
ion 314 (1965) provides that an attorney must disclose the confidences of his client if he knows
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed.
89 Fleming and Maximov, supra note 22, at 1039 n.63. The authors note that the very
atmosphere which deters some patients will attract others. Studies have shown that some
patients disclose in the hopes that such disclosures will make the psychiatrist take control over
them. Id at 1039. Thus, the deterrence factor may be counterbalanced by the attraction of
other patients. Id. at 1040.
90 Fleming and Maximov, supra note 22, at 1039 n.64, citing Goldstein & Katz, Psychia-
trist-Jatient roilege.4 GA P Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175 (1962).
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He could disclose or warn in a fashion that would preserve the pri-
vacy of the patient as fully as possible and still be compatible with
the prevention of the threatened danger.91
IV. Conclusion
Who must decide if, when, and under what conditions a patient
is ready to be released-the courts or the psychiatrists? Of course,
the psychiatrist, as a professional, must make the initial determina-
tion. Should the courts be able to override the psychiatrist's
decision?
A balance, of course, must be reached. A court is forced to
weigh the interests of a particular therapy patient with the interests
of society. The Tarasof court clearly felt that the interests of society
far outweigh the interests of a patient.92 The court noted that, "[i]n
this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure
to danger that would result from a concealed knowledge of the thera-
pist that his patient was lethal. ' 93 The court further noted that,
"[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."'94
Clearly, a balance may be reached. Society benefits from a dis-
creet and directed warning in that a death or injury is prevented.
The patient benefits in two ways: first, the patient is prevented from
committing some violent act for which he would have to suffer the
consequences later; second, the patient continues in therapy since the
confidences are preserved to the greatest possible extent by a discreet
and directed warning. Of course, how the psychiatrist "warns" de-
termines the success for both the patient and society. If the psychiat-
ric profession has not discussed the issue and promulgated procedures
for such warnings, now is surely the time.
Until some consensus is reached, psychiatrists should take three
steps to protect themselves from liability, and society from any possi-
ble harm. First, practicing therapists and mental health care facili-
ties should carefully check state law to determine the scope of their
duty, both to their patients and to the public, since courts are hold-
ing them accountable for diagnosing dangerousness. Second, psychi-
atrists should follow the procedures commonly practiced in their
community by mental health professionals to protect third parties
who might foreseeably be endangered by a patient's conduct. Such
91 Se 17 Cal. 3d 426, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347.
92 Id. at 443, 551 P.2d at 347.
93 Id. See also note 87 supra.
94 Id.
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steps might include notifying a potential victim, calling the police, or
instituting commitment proceedings to ensure that the patient does
not harm third parties. And finally, like any other professional, the
psychiatrist should invest and maintain a healthy malpractice insur-
ance policy. Hopefully, following the first two steps will preclude
reliance on the third.
Sherrie 4. Wolfe
